Ethical Limitations on the State\u27s Use of Arational Persuasion by Sawicki, Nadia N.
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works
2016
Ethical Limitations on the State's Use of Arational
Persuasion
Nadia N. Sawicki
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law, nsawicki@luc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nadia N. Sawicki, Ethical Limitations on the State's Use of Arational Persuasion, 38 LAW & POL'Y 211 (2016).
Ethical Limitations on the State's
Use of Arational Persuasion
NADIA N. SAWICKI
Policy makers frequently use arational appeals and nudges-such as those relying on emotion,
cognitive biases, and subliminal messaging-to persuade citizens to adopt behaviors that support
public goals. However, these communication tactics have been widely criticized for relying on
arational triggers rather than reasoned argument. This article develops a fuller account of the
nonconsequentialist objection to arational persuasion by state actors, focusing on theories of
decisional autonomy and metadecisional voluntariness. The article concludes by proposing
ethically justifiable limitations on state communications that should be compelling to both critics
and advocates of arational persuasion.
INTRODUCTION
In order to achieve its policy objectives, the government must speak. Policy makers recog-
nize, however, that the public is not easily swayed by rational appeals to dry facts. Thus,
state actors put significant energy into developing communication campaigns that will
grab viewers' attention, often using arational triggers-like emotional appeals, dramatic
graphic images, or reliance on cognitive biases-to persuade citizens to act in support of
public goals. State communications on matters of medicine and public health are particu-
larly notable in this regard, arising in contexts as varied as tobacco labeling, nutritional
recommendations, informed consent requirements, and disease prevention. Such meas-
ures have found increased support since the 2008 publication of Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein's Nudge, which advocates the use of libertarian paternalist nudges to further
public policy (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).1 A key feature of Thaler and Sunstein's nudge
model is its recognition that human decision making is marred by bounded rationality
and mistakes in reasoning; in taking advantage of such cognitive errors, many nudges can
be viewed as examples of arational persuasion.
While many commentators agree that some forms of governmental persuasion are ethi-
cally problematic, it can be difficult to identify the theoretical basis for their objections.
Moreover, these objections are not voiced consistently. For example, whether a person
objects to graphic tobacco labeling laws typically depends more on her opinions about
smoking than her perspective on government persuasion generally. Indeed, many exam-
ples of arational appeals-emotionally compelling campaigns about environmental
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protection and military recruiting, for example-are generally viewed positively, perhaps
because public support for these issues is widespread. However, from an ethical perspec-
tive, the legitimacy of such campaigns depends not only on their substantive aims, but
also their methods. Surely, even an attempt to persuade the public to support an uncon-
troverted good may be ethically troubling if it is made using techniques that are deceptive,
coercive, or otherwise autonomy-violating. Unfortunately, such normative arguments
have to date been underdeveloped because of undue focus on the outcomes of persuasive
appeals.
In this article, I develop a nonconsequentialist argument for limiting, but not prohibit-
ing, the state's use of nudges and other arational methods of persuasion in health-related
contexts and beyond. In examining objections to the use of arational persuasion by gov-
ernment actors, I conclude that the strongest basis for justifying restrictions on such per-
suasion is grounded in theories of decisional autonomy and metadecisional voluntariness,
which I define as an actor's ability to structure the procedural conditions under which she
makes decisions. I then evaluate claims that some arational persuasive techniques may be
autonomy-enhancing, and use this analysis to identify possible content-neutral limita-
tions on the use of persuasive government appeals.
Ultimately, I conclude that the state's use of arational persuasive techniques may be
autonomy-enhancing and therefore ethically permissible in two contexts. The first is
where a persuasive appeal is used to trigger attention or provide information for a deci-
sion that the person has no choice but to make, and is provided in a form that is to some
degree avoidable-for example, if it is nongraphic, obvious as to its persuasive intent, and
presented at an early point in the decision-making process. The second is where a persua-
sive appeal is used to allow a person whose autonomy is otherwise compromised (due to
internal constraints like cognitive errors, for example) to make a substantive decision that
comports with what her true interests would be were she acting autonomously-this,
however, requires that the state demonstrate that the person's autonomy is truly compro-
mised and cannot be restored through rational means, and that the persuasive appeal is
designed to be autonomy-enhancing in the long run. These conclusions, notably, call into
question many of the nudging techniques for public health improvement that have
received increased attention since the publication of Nudge.
While recognizing that state actions, in most cases, are ultimately driven by outcomes
rather than by nonconsequentialist ethical considerations, it is my hope that the analysis
presented here will elucidate this important normative argument and help guide policy
makers in developing persuasive communication campaigns, particularly in the contexts
of medicine and public health.
CATEGORIZING PERSUASIVE APPEALS AND DEFINING ARATIONAL PERSUASION
A vast array of literature tries to define the distinctions between persuasion, manipula-
tion, and coercion, but definitions can vary widely. Coercion, commonly understood to
be the most ethically problematic of the three, is typically understood to be the use of "a
credible and severe threat of harm or force" to direct an actor's decision making (Beau-
champ and Childress 2008, 133). The boundaries of manipulation and persuasion, how-
ever, are much more difficult to draw. Manipulation is commonly understood as an
attempt to "sway people to do what the manipulator wants by means other than coercion
or persuasion," such as through deception, misdirection, the withholding of information,
or other mechanisms a rational actor would not support (ibid., 133-34). Persuasion, in
contrast, is not necessarily aimed at promoting the interests of the persuader exclusively,
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and typically contemplates a reasoned "dialogue or debate in which accurate information
is available and in which it is expected that the other side will have its say" (Fishkin 2011,
34).
Some of the difficulty in defining these terms is that they are both descriptive and nor-
mative. The common understanding of manipulation and coercion is a negative one-
that is, when a person manipulates or coerces, she is generally perceived to be acting in an
unethical way. The common understanding of persuasion, however, is less normatively
loaded, and is typically understood to comprise both ethical and unethical actions. It is
because of this perceived normative distinction that commentators are so keen on catego-
rizing actions into one of the three categories.
I resist this approach. While many common examples of manipulation and coercion
seem to be ethically unjustified, it is a mistake to imbue the terms with a priori norma-
tive value. Persuasion, manipulation, and coercion operate on a spectrum, and just as
there can be unethical uses of persuasion, there may be ethical uses of manipulation. A
better way of categorizing the types of conduct that might fall on this spectrum is by ref-
erence to purely descriptive (and therefore normatively neutral) distinctions between
them.
For the purposes of this discussion, I refer to conduct on the spectrum between what is
typically called persuasion and what is typically called coercion as varying types of persua-
sive appeals.2 I define these as attempts by a speaker to move a listener to adopt a point of
view or make a decision to which the listener might not have initially been predisposed.
3
Theoretical justifications of such appeals, I argue, can be evaluated on the basis of three
characteristics-purpose, context, and method.
A speaker's purpose or motivation may affect the normative categorization of a persua-
sive appeal. For example, a persuader who seeks to achieve an outcome that is contrary to
the listener's best interest acts unethically when he makes a persuasive appeal to achieve
this end. A second factor that may impact the justifiability of a persuasive appeal is the
context in which it is made-the relationship between the persuading speaker and the lis-
tener. Where there is an asymmetry in information or power between parties, a persuasive
appeal is more likely to be perceived as unjustifiable than when it is made by a speaker on
equal footing with the listener. Some types of persuasive appeals may also be unjustified
in cases where the persuader stands in a fiduciary relationship with the listener, or a rela-
tionship that otherwise imposes special obligations or responsibilities on the speaker (as
in the case of state actors in a deliberative democracy).
My argument, however, focuses primarily on the third factor-the method by which a
persuasive appeal is made. Some persuasive appeals may be made on purely rational
grounds, presenting truthful facts on both sides of the argument, with no inaccuracies,
omissions, or biases. At the other end of the spectrum, appeals may influence choices on
grounds unrelated to reason-because they distract from rational deliberation, operate
on a plane apart from rational deliberation, or render rational deliberation irrelevant.
Clearly, persuasive appeals vary in the degree to which they engage reason, and the spec-
trum of possibilities makes it impossible to set absolute categorizations. 4 However, draw-
ing the distinction between primarily arational and primarily rational appeals identifies
one objective means by which persuasive messages can be categorized, and so deserves
careful attention.
Human decision making is a complex process. Very few people make what one might
call purely rational decisions-the types of purely logical, almost mathematical calcula-
tions exemplified by Star Trek's Mr. Spock.5 Rather, our choices are necessarily influ-
enced by a variety of what can be termed arational factors-including affect, emotion,
habit, social pressure, bias, heuristics, and the like.6 As a consequence, even if a purely
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rational calculation indicates that Choice A is optimal, the average person may still opt
for Choice B.
Persuasion based on rational factors affects the factual inputs of a person's calculus. A
purely rational persuader merely provides accurate information that supplements or
changes the listener's initial factual understanding. To persuade a smoker to quit, for
example, a rational persuader might say any of the following:
* "Smoking tobacco regularly increases your risk of lung cancer by 60 percent;"
* "City regulations now prohibit smoking in restaurants;"
* "I will not visit your home because it is a smoking household."7
Any of these statements might change the outcome of the listener's deliberative process,
whether the listener is Mr. Spock or the average human.
Persuasion based on arational factors, in contrast, either distracts from, or renders
irrelevant, the listener's reliance on reason in making a given decision. Arational persua-
sion is likely to be effective on the average person, but it would not impact the choices
made by a purely rational actor like Mr. Spock. The following are examples of what might
be considered arational persuasive appeals:
" Emotional or Affect-Based Appeals: Prominently displaying disturbing images of dis-
eased lungs at the point of sale of tobacco products; bursting into tears when a friend
lights a cigarette; discussing the risks of smoking at the funeral of a smoker's loved
one.
" Appeals Relying on Cognitive Biases: Nudging (prominently displaying smoking-
cessation tools at a pharmacy, while keeping cigarettes in a less-visible location); the
availability heuristic (presenting salient or emotionally charged examples when per-
suading someone to quit smoking); optimism bias (suggesting that the listener will be
more successful in her attempt to quit smoking than the average person); herd
instinct ("Everyone else has quit smoking"); priming effects (asking a smoker to read
an article that includes the words cancer, death, and coughing before engaging in a
persuasive conversation).
" Subliminal Messaging: Using subtle or imperceptible stimuli to impact a person's deci-
sions, such as flashing quick visual or auditory stimuli, or using priming effects.
These types of arational appeals have a few things in common. First, they may lead a
listener to make a decision different than the one she would make under a purely rational
calculus. Second, they do not rely on the listener's capacity for reasoned deliberation-
that is, they may be effective even if they provide no new factual inputs into the listener's
calculation.8 Finally, many are in some ways nonobvious-a listener who makes a deci-
sion based on arational persuasion may not know that the persuasive influence impacted
her decision; indeed, she may not be aware of the influence at all.
THE AUTONOMY-BASED OBJECTION TO ARATIONAL PERSUASION
Rational persuasion is commonly considered ethically preferable to arational persuasion.
However, the roots of the objection to arational persuasion can be difficult to decipher.
Much like defining obscenity as "I know it when I see it" (Jacobellis v Ohio 1964, 197
(Stewart, J., concurring)), criticisms of arational persuasion tend to be unsatisfying pre-
cisely because they lack strong theoretic underpinnings. As First Amendment scholar
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Franklyn Haiman writes, "The average American appears to feel considerable ambiva-
lence in regard to hidden persuasion. He vaguely senses there may be something wrong
about it, but when asked to say why, is usually unable to present cogent arguments" (Hai-
man 1958, 386). 9
I argue that the fundamental ethical challenge to persuasion by arational means is
grounded in principles of decisional autonomy. Under this view, arational appeals risk
compromising autonomous decision making, and this risk is further exacerbated when
the persuading party is a state actor committed to facilitating autonomous and demo-
cratic deliberation.
Most simply, autonomy can be defined as self-governance or self-choice. It is the
capacity to make decisions that further one's sense of self without undue interference.
Autonomy is recognized as a nonconsequentialist good-autonomous decisions are valu-
able not necessarily because they reach the so-called right result, but because they are our
own. There is no shortage of debate about the conditions necessary for autonomous deci-
sion making, but I consider four to be both comprehensive and relatively uncontroversial:
identity, capacity, factual understanding, and voluntariness.
Identity requires having a sense of self and being able to establish self-affirming goals.
The degree of identity required to satisfy this condition will depend on the decision in
question-for example, even a person with complete amnesia (and therefore, no sense of
identity in the colloquial sense) may be able to establish self-affirming preferences about
what to eat for dinner. However, amnesia and some other psychiatric conditions (perhaps
even addiction) will frequently affect one's ability to set more substantial identity-
affirming goals.
Capacity encompasses the cognitive ability to understand, interpret, and engage in rea-
soned deliberation. Capacity may be disrupted most substantially by physical injury to
the brain, psychiatric disorder, or the influence of drugs or other intoxicants. Notably,
this condition requires only capacity for rational deliberation, not necessarily its exercise
with respect to any given decision. Thus, even a person influenced by arational factors
like emotion may be able to act autonomously provided that her overall reasoning skills
remain intact.
Factual understanding requires being able to see the world as it actually is, and having
accurate information about the decision to be made. Thus, persons operating under the
influence of deception or mistake of fact may not be able to make autonomous decisions.
For example, if a person reaches for a bottle of stimulants, mistakenly thinking it is a bot-
tle of sleeping pills, she has done so without complete autonomy. But as with issues of
identity, the degree of factual understanding a person must have with respect to any given
decision will vary depending on context.
The final requirement for autonomous action is voluntariness, defined as freedom from
substantial controlling influences, whether external or internal, when deciding or acting. 
10
Of the four conditions of autonomous decision making, voluntariness is the one that most
often intersects with the others, is most often misunderstood, and therefore is in need of
greatest explanation. Notably, it is the condition of voluntariness that is most frequently
impacted by arational persuasive appeals.
VOLUNTARINESS AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
Immanuel Kant, whose theories of autonomy continue to influence contemporary philos-
ophers, emphasized that the exercise of what he calls "practical reason" must be done
without reference to externalities or "alien influences" that cloud one's judgment (Kant
2005, 130). Such alien influences include influences from third parties as well as
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"incitements from desires and impulses" (ibid., 141). John Stuart Mill makes a similar
point: "A person whose desires and impulses are his own ... is said to have a character.
One whose desires and impulses are not his own has no character, no more than a steam
engine has a character" (Mill 1863, 116).
Modern scholars share the notion that certain forms of influence can be autonomy-
inhibiting. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, for example, define autonomy as self-
governance that is "free from both controlling interference by others and from limita-
tions, such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice" (2008, 99)."
Contemporary philosopher Thomas E. Hill, likewise, notes that autonomy requires "a
capacity and disposition to make choices in a rational manner; and this means choosing
in the absence of certain particular attitudes and inner obstacles [that interfere with
rational choice], such as blind acceptance of tradition and authority, neurotic compul-
sions, and the like" (1984, 256).
But clearly, not all forms of persuasive influence impact voluntariness in autonomy-
inhibiting ways. A decision can be fully autonomous even if made by a person whose
deliberations were influenced by third parties. Indeed, it would be impossible to make
many decisions without taking into account external influences. The question, then, is
when a persuasive appeal is so compelling that it effectively negates voluntariness.
Control.k When External Influences Make It Impossible to Act in One's Own Interests
The most obvious type of external influence that negates autonomy by limiting voluntari-
ness is one that makes it impossible or extremely difficult for a person to act in her own
interests. Consider the use of force: If I am physically compelled by a third party to engage
in an action, I am not acting voluntarily, because I am engaged in an action I do not
intend, to further goals that are not my own, and under the influence of forces I cannot
resist. Force is generally understood to negate voluntariness because those compelled to
act by physical forces cannot act in any other way.
Likewise, most would argue that the use of threats, coercion, or extortion ("Your
money or your life") negates voluntariness. In such cases, an external influencer crafts the
conditions of choice to limit the decision maker's options, and the decision maker often
has no reasonable choice but to engage in an act that does not further her interests. 12 Cer-
tainly, some individual decision makers may attempt to defy these threats, but because
such attempts are rare, coercion is typically understood to be a voluntariness-negating
influence.
The use of deception, which impacts factual understanding, may also negate voluntari-
ness, though in a different way. Rather than changing the listener's circumstances (as with
threats or coercion), deception affects the inputs into her deliberation. For example, if an
external influencer falsely convinces a decision maker that her preferences would be satis-
fied by Option 1 (and not Option 2), the reasonable decision maker will choose Option 1.
Option I does not further her true interests, but it would be unreasonable for the average
person to choose otherwise given the information available to her; thus, her ability to act
in her own interests is substantially limited.
Finally, some types of arational appeals may impose similar constraints on the ability
to act in accordance with one's own interests. Emotional persuasion, to cite just one
example, may cause a person to make a choice that does not ultimately further her true
goals. While other options may still be available, a strong emotional influence may sub-
stantially increase the likelihood of choosing an outcome that fails to satisfy her higher-
order preferences. 13 Nudging, another type of arational persuasion, likewise directs a
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decision maker to a preferred default option, albeit while leaving other options open and
easily accessible. 14
Because many decision makers faced with arational appeals will still retain legitimate
identity-furthering options, only some influences will be so substantial as to limit volun-
tariness from the perspective of control. However, arational persuasive appeals may
impact voluntariness in a second, and perhaps more insidious, way.
Conditions of Choice: When External Influences Make It Impossible
to Choose on One's Own Terms
The second, and more subtle, situation where external influence might negate voluntari-
ness is where persuasion impacts an actor's decision-making process in unavoidable and
unconsented-to ways. Thus, while the decision maker is still able to choose to act in fur-
therance of her interests, she must do so while under the influence of unwanted informa-
tion or suasion. As I will demonstrate below, arational persuasive appeals are far more
likely than rational appeals to have this voluntariness-limiting effect on the conditions of
choice. Two examples-one from the discipline of medical ethics and one from American
constitutional law-are helpful in elucidating the manner in which unavoidable external
influences can negatively impact autonomy.
Ethicists acknowledge that a person faced with a medical decision may, consistent with
principles of autonomy, choose in the absence of full information, or even choose not to
decide by delegating her decision making.15 This is known as the doctrine of waiver, where
a patient "voluntarily relinquishes the right to an informed consent and relieves the physi-
cian of the obligation to obtain informed consent" (Beauchamp and Childress 2008, 131-
32). 16 Respecting patients' choices to avoid a decision, delegate a decision, or make a deci-
sion that is not fully informed, according to Alan Meisel and Mark Kuczewski, "respects
their autonomy as much as providing information to patients who want it" (1996,
2525). 17
This is because autonomous decision making has two components-most obviously,
the substantive component about what decision a person actually makes ("What flavor
ice cream will I have today?"), but also a secondary, procedural component about how
that decision is made ("Should I ask the vendor what flavors are available today, or just
guess? Should I consider that my partner, who may be sharing my ice cream, prefers choc-
olate? Should I consider whether the ice cream will stain my white shirt?"). One might
refer to these as the primary decision (substantive) and the metadecision (procedural)
(Meisel 1979). In order for a person to make an autonomous choice, she must have con-
trol over both steps in the decision-making process. Where an external influence controls
or limits her substantive options (as in the cases described above), her primary decision
cannot be said to be voluntary. Where an external influence limits the procedural condi-
tions under which she must choose (as when unwanted information is forced upon her),
her metadecision cannot be said to be voluntary.
A second illustrative example comes from American constitutional law. The captive
audience doctrine permits the state, in limited circumstances, to protect unwilling listeners
from messages communicated in ways that make them difficult or impossible to avoid,
such as the sound of protesters outside an abortion clinic (Hill v Colorado 2000; Madsen v
Women's Health Center, Inc. 1994); residential picketing (Frisby v Schultz 1988); or
unavoidable audible intrusions into the home (FCC v Pacifica Foundation 1978; Kovacs v
Cooper 1949). While the US Supreme Court has never recognized a broader right against
compelled listening, the captive audience doctrine nevertheless recognizes that individuals
have a privacy interest that may be "invaded in an essentially intolerable manner" by
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some unwanted communicative intrusions (Cohen v California 1971, 21). While these
impermissible intrusions are typically intrusions into a home, a physician's office, or other
traditionally private spheres, at least one early Supreme Court case recognized that even
some communications in public spaces may raise similar concerns. 18 The captive audience
doctrine, while based primarily on notions of privacy rather than autonomy, is thus simi-
lar to the waiver doctrine in informed consent. In both, there is a concern that exposure to
unwanted and unavoidable messages will interfere with a person's private deliberations at
a metadecisional level (arguably leading her to make a substantive decision that does not
satisfy her interests).
Indeed, one could argue that persuasive influences that affect a listener's reasoning pro-
cess, rather than limiting her reasonable choice of actions, violate autonomy in an espe-
cially pernicious way. Coercing someone to act against her will or otherwise limiting her
liberty is surely problematic, but at least it preserves the person's ability to reason and
evaluate autonomously. Thus, even though a state may be justified in banning some-
thing-cigarettes, for example-this authority does not necessarily (and should not auto-
matically) include the authority to control the inputs for people's decision making about
tobacco use. 19 The US Supreme Court has recognized this point in the context of govern-
mental regulation of speech, rejecting the "greater-includes-the-lesser" argument as
"inconsistent with ... logic" (44 Liquormart, Inc. v Rhode Island 1996, 511). Noting that
restrictions on speech "may sometimes prove far more intrusive" than restrictions on con-
duct, the justices of the Court rejected "the assumption that words are necessarily less
vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an
activity is necessarily 'greater' than the power to suppress speech about it" (ibid.). While
the Court's reasoning was grounded partly in the fact that the US Constitution provides
explicit protections for freedom of speech, the validity of its argument is not limited to
nations with similar legal regimes. The drafters of the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion believed that freedom of thought and the freedom to communicate without state
interference or control were fundamental rights, and this moral sentiment is widely shared
in most pluralistic societies.
For an example of how the distinction between influencing decision-making processes
and influencing action might play out in practice, consider efforts by the state to promote
dental health.2z Imagine there are two options available to achieve this goal: one, fluori-
dation of the public water supply; second, the insertion of subliminal messages in radio
programming to encourage people to brush their teeth. By traditional accounts, forcing
people to ingest fluoride without their consent for paternalistic reasons seems more ethi-
cally troubling. But apart from vocal minorities in some municipalities, there is limited
widespread objection to fluoridation. In contrast, were people to discover that they had
been subject to subliminal advertising, even for as positive a goal as improving dental
health, public outrage would likely ensue.2 1
In both examples, the state intervention may be unknown to the vast majority of peo-
ple; in both, people will improve their dental health through no conscious decision of their
own. But the influence of subliminal advertising on listeners' thought processes seems dif-
ferent in kind than compulsory fluoridation. Those opposed to compulsory fluoridation
are still able to consciously consider the policy and oppose it without the intrusion of state
messages into their deliberations. Hausman and Welch (2010, 131) conclude that influenc-
ing people to brush their teeth by way of a subliminal message "may be a greater threat to
liberty, broadly conceived ... because it threatens people's control over their own evalua-
tions and deliberation and is so open to abuse." While subliminal advertising may be an
extreme example, the same outcome would likely play out were the state to communicate
through appeals to emotions or cognitive biases-a person's thought process would be
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affected without her consent, and she would not be able to make a substantive decision
without the intrusion of the government's message.
The Impact of Arational Persuasive Techniques
Arational persuasive appeals by their very nature are more likely than rational appeals to
affect the conditions of choice in unavoidable ways. In changing the conditions of choice,
arational appeals impact metadecisional voluntariness and, consequently, the ability of a
decision maker to choose autonomously.
Consider emotional persuasion, for example. A persuader who causes a decision maker
to enter an emotionally aroused state (whether the emotion is directly related to the deci-
sion at hand or not)22 may be impinging on her autonomy in a variety of ways. If the emo-
tional disturbance is severe enough-for example, if it triggers a psychotic break or a
severely depressed state-it may impinge on the actor's capacity or cognitive ability.
More commonly, however, where the capacity for rational decision making remains
intact, some forms of emotional persuasion are better understood as negating the condi-
tion of voluntariness by introducing unwanted inputs into the decision-making process.
As a wide body of research in communications and behavioral psychology has shown,
emotionally triggering appeals-in particular, fear appeals and graphic images-have an
unavoidable impact on a person's decision-making process (Feigenson and Park 2006;
Poels and Dewitte 2006; Forgas 2003). While the precise mechanism by which emotional
influences affect deliberation is unknown, the existence of the connection is clear.
Researchers have demonstrated that emotional responses precede cognitive or rational
responses, and that decisions affected by emotional or affective triggers are made intui-
tively and automatically, long before any reasoning or rationalization could occur
(Zajonc 1980). Moreover, emotional appeals are often more effective than nonemotional
appeals in triggering behavioral change (Blumenthal-Barby and Burroughs 2012; Lang
and Yegiyan 2008), and decisions made on the basis of emotion or affect tend to be made
with greater confidence (Zajonc 1980). This influence is exacerbated when the emotional
influence is in the form of a graphic appeal, as messages conveyed through images capture
attention and trigger emotional responses more quickly than textual or verbal messages
(Tushnet 2012).23 Because of the intrinsic connection between emotional influence and
subsequent decision making, persuasive emotional appeals may cause a person to choose
without full voluntariness at the metadecisional level.
Persuasive appeals like nudges that rely on listeners' cognitive biases may likewise nega-
tively impact metadecisional voluntariness. Cognitive biases are systematic errors in
human perception that lead people to make choices they might not support were they
aware of these intrinsic flaws in reasoning (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). For example, a
health-conscious customer at a lunch buffet might load her tray with fried chicken rather
than steamed broccoli simply because the fried chicken is presented at the start of the buf-
fet. Were she to think carefully about her decision, she would opt for broccoli, but the
availability and visibility of the fried chicken effectively distracts her from thinking about
the choice and whether it supports her interests. In much the same way natural choice
architecture may influence decision making in ways that are unknowable and unavoid-
able, intentional external influences may do the same.
As another example, consider the impact of priming effects, a phenomenon where a
person's exposure to one stimulus (i.e., an article using the words cancer, death, and
coughing) subsequently influences her response to a second stimulus (i.e., an offer of a cig-
arette from a friend). Even though the person draws no conscious connection between the
two stimuli, the first stimulus affects her subsequent choices. And because she is being
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exposed to something that at the time of its presentation has no explicit connection to her
future decisions, she has no reason to consider avoiding it. While her options when mak-
ing a primary substantive decision are not limited in any way, she lacks the metadecisional
opportunity to choose how she will make her primary decision.
In contrast, rational persuasive appeals are less likely to negate metadecisional volun-
tariness because they are typically easier to recognize and avoid. With respect to recogniz-
ability, rational appeals by their very nature tend to be obvious and direct. The purpose
of rational persuasion is to trigger reasoned and conscious deliberation, and this purpose
is not well served when the persuasive appeal is obscured from the decision maker. Where
the existence of a persuasive appeal is obvious to the decision maker, she then has the
affirmative option to exclude the appeal from her deliberations; no such opportunity is
available to a decision maker faced with many arational appeals. With respect to avoid-
ability, the methods by which rational appeals tend to be communicated may also make
them easier to avoid as compared to arational appeals. A persuader making a rational
appeal will often present facts and lines of argument, typically either verbally or in textual
communication. Arational appeals, in contrast, often seek to persuade by altering the
environment in which a person makes a decision, or providing visual or other stimuli that
decision makers cannot avoid.
Tobacco labeling laws are a helpful example. While it is relatively easy to tune out and
avoid reading the Surgeon General's written warning on a package of cigarettes, it would
be much harder to avoid being influenced by graphic images depicting the negative health
consequences of smoking (such as photographs of diseased lungs, cancerous oral lesions,
and cadavers) that take up 50 percent or more of cigarette packaging (US Food and Drug
Administration 2011). As explained below, a written appeal takes greater conscious effort
to comprehend and thus is more easily avoidable than a graphic appeal.
Of course, there may be some rational appeals that similarly fail the avoidability test-
such as factual information shouted loudly outside an abortion clinic (i.e., "A three-
month-old fetus has fingerprints!"). Likewise, not all arational appeals are unavoidable-
a textual description about living with lung cancer that uses dramatic and emotionally
triggering words (i.e., excruciating pain, disgusting hole in my throat, or violent, hacking
coughs), for example, may be easier to avoid than a billboard featuring only a dramatic
and emotionally triggering image of a person with a tracheotomy. That said, arational
persuasive appeals are on the whole more likely than most rational appeals to be unrecog-
nizable and/or unavoidable, and therefore more likely to violate metadecisional
voluntariness.
THE STATE AS EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
Ethical and practical concerns about arational appeals' impact on voluntariness are exa-
cerbated when the state is the persuading party, because the state may bear unique ethical
obligations to further citizens' autonomous deliberation in a way that private parties do
not. Furthermore, government speech may be more likely than private speech to nega-
tively impact voluntariness because it is characteristically more widespread and may be
perceived as carrying greater weight.
Ethics of State Communications
In an ideal world where everyone strives for virtuous conduct, all persuaders would act in
ways that optimally facilitate autonomous choice. But in the real world, there is generally
no guarantee that persuaders will act in autonomy-furthering ways. Advertisements by
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commercial companies, for example, are widely understood to be aimed at selling prod-
ucts rather than facilitating informed choices.
This is where the distinctive role of the state as persuasive speaker comes into play. Under
political theories of deliberative democracy, the state has unique obligations not shared by
private parties to create the conditions possible for democratic debate and deliberation.
These include respecting citizens' autonomy, facilitating voluntary and informed decision
making, and avoiding certain kinds of autonomy-inhibiting communications.
Noted scholars from Kant to Habermas share the conviction that some forms of per-
suasive state speech risk violating the norms of democratic discourse. According to politi-
cal theorist Nathaniel Klemp, for example, political manipulation (which he defines as
the state's use of hidden or irrational force) "erodes the epistemic quality of political
debate" and "threatens the ideal of democracy as rule of the people" by creating
"conditions of choice that distort sound decision-making and erode the democratic ideal
of popular sovereignty" (2010, 76-77). Philosophers Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch
likewise argue that arational nudges by the government "may be inconsistent with the
respect toward citizens that a representative government ought to show" (2010, 134). The-
ories of deliberative democracy also impose some substantive limitations on the types
of reasoning that state speakers may offer in support of their positions in a pluralistic
society-namely, that state arguments ought to be based on public reason (arguments
that everyone in a community could accept as valid) rather than private reasons (values
or beliefs shared by only a subset of the community) (Rawls 1997a, 1997b).
In defining problematic types of political persuasion, many scholars focus specifically
on the emotional nature of certain public appeals (Halfmann and Young 2010; Haiman
1958). It is precisely because deliberative democracy, by its very nature, ought to be rea-
son based that emotional appeals by politicians "ha[ve] corrosive effects on the delibera-
tive process" (Klemp 2010, 67).24 Indeed, even the most prominent supporters of the
state's use of emotional persuasion caution that this technique can be problematic. Aris-
totle, for example, recognized the importance of arational persuasion but understood
that many forms of what might be called "undemocratic manipulation" can lead to tyr-
anny (Ball 2010, 46). Reflecting on Aristotle's concerns, Terence Ball comments that
"perhaps the greatest and most dangerous disadvantage of democracy is that such citizens
are alternately agitated, pandered to, flattered, and fooled by demagogues who play to
their hopes, their prejudices, and -most especially - their fears" (ibid., 54).
These obligations of ethical conduct may serve to distinguish communications by state
actors in deliberative democracies from communications by private citizens or corpora-
tions. This is not to say that, under some theories of communications, private parties may
also be bound by ethical obligations to avoid autonomy-inhibiting persuasion. But to
the extent that political theories of deliberative democracy require a foundation of
rational deliberation and debate among interested parties, there is firmer doctrinal
ground for considering the ethics of state communications.
26
Characteristics of State Speech
A second factor that calls into question the ethical propriety of some forms of state per-
suasion is that state speech has a much greater practical likelihood of negating voluntari-
ness due to its power and its scope. In politics, of course, there are very few instances of
political persuasion that make it truly impossible for a person to act in her own interests
(as by the use of force). However, political speech has the potential to negate voluntari-
ness in the second, more subtle way, discussed above-by interfering in unwanted and
unavoidable ways in citizens' decision-making processes. Legal scholar David Strauss,
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for example, describes the autonomy-based argument against government persuasion as
the idea that government should not "interfere with a person's control over her own rea-
soning processes" and deprive her of the opportunity for reasoned evaluation of argu-
ments (1991, 354).
Thus, some forms of political persuasion or legal regulation may threaten to be so
powerful that they effectively substitute the judgment of a single entity in power for the
judgment of the democratic body (Klemp 2010; Greenspan 2003). This power arises in
part because government communications may, in many cases, be harder to avoid than
private speech. The government, unlike a private speaker, directs its speech to the whole
citizenry, and does so with the express goal of influencing the public's decisions and
behavior. If the power and expanse of the government means that its messages are in
effect unavoidable, then those messages inevitably intrude into personal decision making
at the metadecisional level.
The context of informed consent abortion laws in the United States provides one con-
crete example of this. In many states, physicians are required by law to provide women
seeking abortions with state-mandated materials about the risks of abortion, which often
include color images of the fetus at various stages of development. Yet other states have
adopted ultrasound display-and-describe laws, which require that a physician obtaining a
woman's informed consent to abortion first perform an ultrasound, display the image of
the fetus to the patient, and verbally describe the image to the patient, even if she does not
wish to receive this information (La. Rev. Stat Ann § 40:1061.10(D); NC.Gen Stat § 90-
21.85, permanently enjoined by Stuart v Camnitz 2014; Okla Stat tit 63 § 1-738.3d, found
unconstitutional by Nova Health Systems v Pruitt 2012; Tex Health & Safety Code Ann
§ 171.012(a)(4) and (5), upheld on motion for preliminary injunction by Texas Medical
Providers Performing Abortion Services v Lakey 2012; Wisc Stat Ann § 253.10(3g)). These
communications are experienced in the privacy of the physician's office, a location women
seeking abortions cannot avoid. In this way, the state's power to enact legislation can
implicate its greater power to compel exposure to unwanted and unavoidable messages.
A second concern is that people's expectations of the government's speech may lead lis-
teners to give government speech more credence or attention than it deserves. A recom-
mendation from an official authority, for example, is likely to carry more power than a
recommendation from a private individual-perhaps due to expectations that the state
has more accurate information, that it relies on expertise unavailable to the general pub-
lic, or that it will in fact conduct itself in autonomy-furthering ways.
JUSTIFYING STATE ARATIONAL PERSUASION
In the section above, I concluded that arational persuasive appeals by the state are more
likely than rational appeals to affect metadecisional voluntariness and violate decisional
autonomy. Here, I demonstrate that while a commitment to the deontological value of
autonomous decision making requires a cautious approach to arational persuasion, it
does not bar the practice entirely. First, not all forms of arational persuasion actually
hinder metadecisional voluntariness-for example, when arational triggers are merely
used to draw attention, but leave a person's capacity for subsequent autonomous decision
making unimpaired. Second, if a person is hindered from acting in her own interests due
to internal cognitive constraints, the state may be ethically justified in enhancing her deci-
sional autonomy by intervening in ways that would be consistent with her autonomous
preferences. Understanding these two conditions helps maintain a commitment to
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principles of autonomous decision making while still setting reasonable guidelines as to
when the state's use of arational persuasion might be justified.
TRIGGERING AUTONOMOUS DECISION MAKING
Arational state persuasion may promote decisional autonomy in cases where it is neces-
sary to trigger autonomous and reasoned decision making that would not otherwise
occur. Arational state appeals are often justified as a means of increasing public engage-
ment; indeed, such appeals are valuable tools for those who govern a public that has
shown itself to be nonresponsive to the neutral presentation of facts. Thus, one might
argue, as long as citizens' ultimate deliberations are autonomous, arational appeals may
be justifiable when they inspire a listener to engage thoughtfully with an issue she is likely
to be faced with in the future, or are necessary to make salient information the listener
needs to make a fully autonomous choice.
An example of the first-an arational appeal that inspires a person to engage thought-
fully with an issue she is likely to face-might be a highly emotional and dramatic "This is
your brain on drugs" antidrug video aimed at junior high school students. By relying on
emotional images rather than factual information, it takes advantage of arational factors
to persuade. However, such a campaign might ultimately be autonomy-enhancing
because, while these students may not yet have been exposed to drug use, the campaign
may draw their attention to the issue and cause them to think preemptively about how
they would respond if they were faced with peer pressure to use drugs. Later, when faced
with such pressure, a student might be able to act with greater autonomy by resisting peer
influences. While the immediate impact of such an appeal may be arational, it may cause
a person to engage with the issue and give it careful thought in a way that a bland and
purely rational appeal would not.27
An example of the second-an arational appeal that provides salient information help-
ful to making an autonomous decision-might be an antismoking advertisement featur-
ing an emotionally upsetting video of a person with a tracheotomy. 28 While the viewer
may be generally aware of the link between smoking and cancer, she may not understand
the physical consequences and quality of life issues surrounding treatment for cancer of
the larynx. By making these consequences more salient through a graphic appeal, this
type of arational trigger may communicate information that a fact-based rational appeal
cannot. The viewer, provided with this new information, may then be able to make a
more informed decision about whether to stop smoking.29 Thus, an arational trigger that
leaves undisturbed the person's ability to reason autonomously and make informed deci-
sions in the future might be a permissible form of persuasion.
CORRECTING FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
In some instances, arational persuasion may be autonomy-enhancing if it can override
the effects of internal or external hindrances to voluntary decision making. A classic
example is the nudge model advocated by some behavioral economists, which recognizes
that a variety of cognitive biases often prevent individuals from making the choices that
they would make under ideal conditions of reason. Supporters of nudge suggest that pol-
icy makers and other decision architects are justified in taking advantage of these cogni-
tive biases in order to lead members of the public to outcomes that they would have
chosen under rational conditions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
The appeal of this approach, according to advocates, is that the individual being per-
suaded can have no objection to its outcome. Consider a rational actor, who would
choose to fill three-quarters of his plate with vegetables rather than fried chicken; often,
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cognitive tricks like attentional bias, choice-supportive bias, and selective perception will
cause him to choose the less healthy but seemingly more delicious option. Assuming the
rational choice is to fill one's plate with vegetables, we might not object if a cafeteria man-
ager offers the same choices but merely changes the design of the buffet, placing healthier
options at the head of the line (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). There would also likely be little
controversy if the cafeteria featured posters with attractive images of vegetables and
inspirational messages of health. Thus, perhaps one way of distinguishing between per-
missible and impermissible state arational appeals is to consider whether those appeals
correct for internal errors that impact voluntariness and lead the listener to reach a con-
clusion that he, upon rational and autonomous consideration, would support.
SETTING REASONABLE LIMITATIONS
These proposals are not, however, without problems. Appeals that use arational means to
trigger attention, make needed information salient, or correct for internal constraints, still
run the risk of inhibiting metadecisional voluntariness. Moreover, defending state ara-
tional persuasion on the grounds that it fosters decisions people would make under auton-
omous conditions is problematic because it violates the deontological commitment we
began with. A person who makes the so-called right decision as a result of voluntariness-
inhibiting influences (even if we define the right decision as the one she would have made
had she been acting autonomously) is not acting freely. While the state may certainly have
legitimate utilitarian reasons for taking this approach, defending arational persuasion on
this basis effectively negates the autonomy argument altogether.
However, there are two ways to effectively negotiate around these problems. First, it
may be possible to distinguish between appeals that significantly impact metadecisional
voluntariness, and those that are less sticky and therefore more ethically justifiable. Sec-
ondly, one might distinguish between situations where arational appeals are truly neces-
sary to eliminate or negate a decision maker's internal constraints, and those where such
appeals are used simply because they are more convenient than relying on rational persua-
sion. In exploring these limitations, I will be relying on examples of persuasive state
appeals in the medical and public health contexts, including laws requiring graphic
tobacco labeling, food labeling, and informed consent to abortion.
Ensuring Metadecisional Voluntariness
If people have a right to choose whether or not to make a decision at all, as well as the
right to choose what factors they take into consideration when making a decision, then
introducing unwanted arational triggers or relying on arational techniques to correct for
internal hindrances may interfere with this right. However, while people have a right to
choose to avoid decision making altogether, some decisions simply cannot be avoided,
particularly in medical and public health contexts. Thus, there can be no legitimate claim
of waiver in such situations. For example, it is almost inevitable that a teenager will some-
day be faced with peer pressure to do drugs; and at that time, she will have to choose a
course of action. Similarly, a person choosing foods in a supermarket or cafeteria line can-
not avoid a decision unless she chooses not to eat. In such cases, a person cannot oppose
arational persuasion on the grounds that it is prompting her to think about a decision she
has chosen not to make (or to avoid).
Even in cases where a person will be called upon at some point to make a decision, the
introduction of persuasive influences may not always negate the voluntariness of a per-
son's choice. For an external influence to negate metadecisional voluntariness, it needs to
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be both unwanted and unavoidable-either because it is so prominent that the person has
no choice but to internalize it (as with a graphic billboard directly in her line of sight), or
because it is presented in a hidden way unlinked to the decision and so does not offer a
person the opportunity to consciously avoid it (as with choice architecture). But as some
appeals may be more easily avoided than others, a person who has an opportunity to
exclude an arational influence from her decision making may still be able to maintain vol-
untariness at the metadecisional level. Three characteristics are particularly relevant to
this inquiry.
First, there are distinctions in terms of avoidability depending on the format in which the
persuasive appeal is presented-whether it is graphic or textual, whether it is large or small,
whether the person must face it directly or whether they have the opportunity to turn away.
As noted above, images are more quickly internalized than words, and have an almost
instantaneous effect on reasoning and decision making. In contrast, even the most emotion-
ally stirring textual description is more easily avoidable than the same message presented in
visual or audio form. For example, surely the state may require that food packaging include
nutritional information, or that people seeking loans be presented with a stack of paper-
work describing the risks of borrowing money. However, it is relatively simple for a con-
sumer to avoid these disclosures. Food labels tend to be discreet and unobtrusive, 30 and a
borrower is free to sign loan documents without reading them. In such cases, the listener is
offered the opportunity to consider the state's message as part of her decision-making pro-
cess but is free to ignore it if she so chooses. This opportunity is not, however, available in
the contexts of graphic tobacco labeling and preabortion ultrasound requirements. As a
matter of course, it is much easier to avoid reading words and subsequently understand
their meaning than to avoid looking at an image, even briefly, and internalizing it. Support-
ers of tobacco and ultrasound laws may argue that a smoker need not look at the package
of cigarettes she is purchasing and that a woman seeking an abortion can avert her eyes
when her physician is describing the ultrasound. But these suggestions are unrealistic.
When a color image composes 50 percent of the front of cigarette packaging, it is nearly
impossible for a purchaser to avoid the image. To avoid the ultrasound image and descrip-
tion, a woman must effectively shut her eyes and stop her ears.
A second consideration impacting voluntariness and avoidability is whether the persua-
sive motives of an appeal are obvious or hidden. A smoker buying a pack of cigarettes is
consciously aware that the images on the box are state-sponsored messages intended to
dissuade her from smoking. Because she is aware that this is a persuasive appeal, she can
perhaps make a choice to avoid it. In contrast, a regulation that requires stores to promi-
nently display smoking-cessation tools at the checkout counter while hiding cigarettes at
the back of the store is a persuasive tactic that many consumers simply will not notice or
will not recognize as an active persuasive appeal; thus, consumers will have no opportu-
nity to make a choice to avoid it. A similar argument can be made regarding subliminal
messages and priming effects, which are not only unavoidable, but unrecognizable-an
individual who would prefer not to take the state's perspective into account does not have
the opportunity to make this choice when the state message is being presented at a sub-
conscious level.
A final consideration that may be relevant to a persuasive appeal's impact on metadeci-
sional voluntariness is its timing. Concerns about the autonomy-inhibiting effects of cer-
tain arational appeals may be exacerbated when the persuasive appeals are made
immediately at the point of decision making. The stickiness of some emotional and
graphic appeals, for example, is likely to be greatest immediately after the appeal is pre-
sented but may fade over time-either because the person's recollection of the appeal
diminishes or because she becomes more able to consciously exclude it from her future
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decision making. For example, presenting an unnecessary ultrasound image to a woman
seeking an abortion at the moment that she is consenting to the procedure is likely to be
more autonomy-inhibiting than presenting this image earlier in her decision-making
process.
If these arguments are compelling, arational appeals may be justifiable as autonomy-
enhancing (or at least not autonomy-inhibiting) in situations where (1) they are used to
trigger attention or provide salient information for a decision that the person must make,
and (2) they are provided in forms that are to some degree avoidable-for example, if
they are textual rather than graphic, obvious as to their persuasive intent, and presented
at an early point in the decision-making process. The more these avoidability conditions
are satisfied, the more likely the nudge or arational appeal is to be ethically justifiable.
Thus, a state using arational appeals for the purpose of triggering autonomous decision
making would be well advised to consider options that pose less of a threat to metadeci-
sional voluntariness. It should aim to present its arational appeals using formats that a
decision maker can avoid internalizing if she so chooses-for example, using emotionally
charged textual descriptions rather than emotionally charged graphic images; presenting
decision makers with brochures rather than billboards; or using other formats that a
viewer can avoid. States should also seek to put decision makers on notice when they are
making persuasive appeals-essentially providing a warning to the effect of, "We are
going to try to convince you of something; if you do not want to be convinced, you can
decline." This suggestion, notably, calls into question the merits of nudging by choice
architecture, where a decision maker is placed in a situation where she is not aware that
the state is intending to shape her opinions. 31 Finally, states should aim to present their
arational appeals in advance of the time the decision maker will be called upon to choose
rather than immediately at the point of choice, where there is less of an opportunity to dis-
engage with the state's message.
Returning to some of the examples above, a state wishing to use arational persuasive
appeals to persuade citizens to eat healthy foods, avoid tobacco, or choose childbirth over
abortion would thus be more justified in approaching these issues by way of general pub-
lic education campaigns rather than directed appeals at the point of sale (for tobacco and
food products) or during a doctor's appointment (for abortion). Such appeals would be
preferable in terms of timing and in terms of obviousness, which might then give the state
some leeway in terms of format. Graphic billboards or advertisements about the risks of
smoking, obesity, and abortion, however, would still likely be problematic. Despite being
general education campaigns, these types of appeals may be unavoidable, presented to
viewers without warning, and internalized quickly even by viewers who turn away.
Remedying Conditions of Constraint
The second justification for arational state appeals is that they may be necessary to allow
a person whose autonomy is otherwise compromised to make a substantive decision that
comports with her own true interests. If the state is unable to remove constraints to a per-
son's voluntary decision making, then perhaps it may be justified in taking advantage of
these constraints (like cognitive errors, for example) in order to achieve an outcome that
the autonomous actor would support. Under such an approach, however, any kind of
appeal would be justifiable if it led to the right ends; and surely, there are some techniques
an ethical persuader may not use. If the legitimacy of the state's persuasive appeal
depends on whether its outcome is consistent with the decision that would be made under
autonomous conditions, then we have not come much further than judging persuasive
appeals based on substantive approval or disapproval of the underlying goal.
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There is, however, a way to defend against this objection without abandoning the non-
consequentialist commitment to autonomy. When choosing between an autonomy-
enhancing persuasive appeal and one that causes a person to make a nonautonomous
decision that nevertheless satisfies her interests (and that she would approve of after the
fact), the supporter of autonomy would surely choose the first. But there may be some
cases where the persuader has no such choice. For example, a person's cognitive biases
might be so ingrained that debiasing is impossible; or a person might be hindered by con-
straints that a persuading party cannot remove using rational appeals. A classic example
would be the man standing on the edge of a bridge, attempting suicide. Most would agree
that an observer would be justified in using force or trickery to stop the man from jump-
ing-the presumption being that no fully autonomous actor would choose suicide, that
intervention is necessary to prevent a harm that the man cannot understand due to his
mental illness, and that no amount of rational persuasion will convince him that he is act-
ing against his own interests. By rescuing the man against his will and offering him the
opportunity for treatment and counseling, he can be restored to his autonomous and vol-
untary state, in which he (presumably) would agree that suicide would have been a
mistake.
Might we use this example as an analogy? For example, would it be permissible to use
graphic tobacco labels to persuade a smoker at the point of sale to put down a pack of cig-
arettes on the grounds that he is operating under the influence of addiction, and that no
amount of rational reasoning will convince him to quit, even though quitting is in his self-
defined interests? 32 Perhaps, but only if we determine that the three conditions necessary
to justify the suicide intervention are present here. First, the state actor must be reason-
ably sure that the subject is not in a position to make a fully autonomous decision,
whether due to internal or external constraints (in the case of the suicide attempt, mental
illness). Second, he must be reasonably sure that there is no way to remove these con-
straints and restore the actor's autonomy through rational persuasion (because it is diffi-
cult to reason with a person attempting suicide). Finally, the method the state uses, even if
arational and autonomy-inhibiting in the moment, must be designed to be autonomy-
restoring in the long run in a way the decision maker would ultimately approve of (by
ensuring that he will be provided with mental health treatment to address his suicidal
ideation, for example).
How easy or difficult it will be to satisfy these conditions in public health contexts will
vary. While it is relatively easy to conclude that most people attempting suicide are acting
under the influence of factors that render their decision not fully voluntary, it is much
more difficult to conclude that a person making choices that have a less severe impact on
his health or safety--eating fried chicken rather than broccoli, for example-is doing so
without full voluntariness. And the fact that humans necessarily operate with bounded
rationality and frequently act under the influences of cognitive biases is likely not enough,
on its own, to negate voluntariness for these purposes. If we treated every decision made
as a result of natural cognitive errors as nonautonomous, then the state could potentially
intervene in an extraordinary number of contexts.
Furthermore, there are many contexts where rational persuasion could serve to debias
an actor or otherwise free him from internal or external constraints. Providing nutrition
information on a food label or in a cafeteria, for example, may help diners think carefully
about the choices they are making rather than reflexively reaching for the most accessible
food option. A woman pressured by her partner to have an abortion may be able to make
a more autonomous decision if she is provided with information about counseling and
safe houses for victims of domestic violence. However, the degree of effort needed to
restore an actor's voluntariness by way of rational persuasion is surely also relevant-how
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hard must we try to persuade the actor through rational means before we decide that these
means are ineffective? How this question is answered will have a significant impact on when
and how frequently arational persuasion may be justified.
Finally, unlike the case of saving a person attempting suicide in order to provide him
with mental health treatment, not every state attempt at arational persuasion in health
contexts is ultimately aimed at restoring autonomous decision making. Viewing graphic
tobacco images does not cure addiction; nor do emotionally compelling ultrasound
images restore voluntary decision making for a woman coerced into abortion. Presenting
broccoli at the head of the cafeteria line does nothing to cure cognitive bias; in fact, it
takes advantage of it. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the state's prediction about
what the autonomous actor would have wanted will be correct.
Thus, while it may be challenging for the state to claim that arational persuasive
appeals are necessary to correct for existing constraints on decisional autonomy, it is the-
oretically possible. To justify its position, the state must be able to demonstrate that the
subject's autonomy is significantly compromised due to internal or external constraints;
that there is no efficient way to eliminate these constraints through rational persuasion;
and that its methods are aimed at restoring the subject's autonomy in the long term.
CONCLUSION
This article presents a normative theory that calls into question whether the state's use of
arational persuasion, particularly in public health and medical contexts, is ethically pernis-
sible. I conclude that the exercise of decisional autonomy demands freedom from external
influences that impede voluntary decision making, and that arational persuasive techni-
ques, particularly when used by state actors, threaten to violate this requirement because
they typically affect peoples' thought processes in nonobvious or unavoidable ways.
Imposing an absolute prohibition on the state's use of arational appeals, however, is
unwise for a variety of reasons-particularly because such appeals may, in some cases, be
necessary to facilitate autonomous decision making. I conclude that there are two limited
contexts in which the state can legitimately claim authority to persuade citizens using ara-
tional means. First, arational persuasive appeals may be autonomy-enhancing in situa-
tions where they are used to trigger attention or provide information for a decision that
the person has no choice but to make, and they are provided in forms that are to some
degree avoidable-for example, if they are textual rather than graphic, obvious as to their
persuasive intent, and presented at an early point in the decision-making process. Second,
such appeals may be autonomy-enhancing when they allow a person whose autonomy is
otherwise compromised to make a substantive decision that comports with what her true
interests would be were she acting autonomously. However, this is likely to be the case in
only limited situations-where the state actor can be sure that the subject of persuasion is
not in a position to make a fully voluntary and autonomous decision; where there is no
way to effectively remove these constraints through rational persuasion; and where the
persuasive methods used, even if arational and autonomy-inhibiting in the moment, are
designed to be autonomy-restoring in the long run.
These limitations are both ethically sound and practically feasible. They recognize theo-
ries of metadecisional voluntariness that protect an individual's right to make choices on
her own grounds; acknowledge the fact that arational state appeals are more likely than
other forms of persuasion to impact metadecisional voluntariness; and yet acknowledge
that, in some cases, such techniques may facilitate autonomous decision making.
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The proposal set forth in this article, it should be emphasized, is based on nonconse-
quentialist ethical theories alone. In practice, states take into account a variety of conse-
quentialist concerns when making policy decisions and often prioritize these concerns
over considerations raised by deontological theorists. This article does not propose that
states abandon concerns about the practical outcomes of their policy decisions-indeed,
arational appeals may be justified in a variety of contexts where their autonomy-limiting
effects are minimal and the public benefit is great. 33 Rather, this article cautions that
when states rely on persuasive messaging to achieve policy goals without considering the
methods by which they seek to persuade, important ethical considerations are lost. Identi-
fying nonconsequentialist limitations on persuasive government speech, therefore, is an
important step in encouraging policy makers to be more thoughtful when considering
how to communicate the state's messages to the public.
NOTES
1. A "'nudge," as described by Thaler and Sunstein, is an alteration of choice architecture in such a
way that predictably leads people to make decisions that maximize well-being. A nudge is pater-
nalistic in that it encourages decisions that further the chooser's best interests (which, conven-
iently, in the examples they provide, also seem to further public interests as a whole). However,
it is also libertarian, in that a nudge does not constrain peoples' options-people can effectively
opt out of the nudged option without much cost or effort.
2. This choice of language is arguably controversial. For example, in discussing persuasion, Ruth
Faden and Tom Beauchamp (1986) refer to it as a purely rational appeal, distinct in kind from
what they term manipulation and coercion.
3. In framing the definition as one of attempt, rather than success, I do not bind the terms to a
given outcome-that is, a persuasive appeal may be unsuccessful and still be described as per-
suasive. Compare my approach with that of Faden and Beauchamp, who refer to persuasion as
an "intentional and successful attempt" (1986, 261, 347).
4. To cite just one example, presenting facts in support of a position without presenting correspond-
ing facts supporting the opposite position-such as providing information about the harms of
smoking without acknowledging the pleasure many people gain from smoking-clearly falls on
the side of rational appeal. However, even such a rational appeal may be autonomy-hindering
inasmuch as its persuasiveness depends on the omission of relevant facts. This article,
however, focuses primarily on the impact of arational (rather than rational) influences on decision
making.
5. Note that this differs from a purely utilitarian calculation, because even a completely rational
decision maker may take into account nonconsequentialist moral values.
6. Indeed, neurological research demonstrates that people whose brains are unable to process
emotional and affective signals have significantly impaired decision-making capacity (see
Bechara 2004; Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio 2000).
7. I offer this statement as an example of rational persuasion, although it may operate somewhat
differently from the other factual statements. Like what some might colloquially term coercion
or manipulation, this appeal is not purely informational-rather, it fundamentally changes the
external circumstances under which the actor makes her decision (akin to "If you do not give
me your wallet, I will shoot you."). However, the information about this change in circumstan-
ces also constitutes a new factual input that a rational actor would consider. Note, however,
that there may also be emotional influences in this situation-sadness, for example-that would
affect an actor's decision making in arational ways.
8. Consider an image of a cancerous lung on cigarette packaging. This image may be effective in
changing an actor's behavior both because it triggers disgust at a subconscious level and
because it provides new factual input into his rational deliberation (for example, if he did not
know there was a link between smoking and lung cancer). However, the arational aspects of the
appeal may be so compelling that the actor might change his behavior even if he is rationally
unaffected by the factual input (for example, if he already knows about the link between smok-
ing and cancer).
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9. Likewise, in the specific context of public health communications, John Rossi and Michael
Yudell note that while the public often views emotionally persuasive public health campaigns as
problematic, "the reasons for this are often incompletely explained or explored" (2012, 192).
10. Voluntariness incorporates not only voluntary decision making, but also intentionality of
action-that is, one's engagement in an intended physical act (as opposed to action as a result
of seizure, spasm, or physical force).
11. Beauchamp and Childress also define an autonomous person as "one who has the capacity to
reflectively accept, identify with, or repudiate a lower order desire independently of others'
manipulation of that desire" (2008, 100).
12. However, voluntariness is not thwarted merely because a decision maker is offered only one rea-
sonable alternative. The nature of the proffered alternatives, and the fact that they are limited
to non-identity-furthering options, is just as important. For further discussion of this point, see
Wertheimer and Miller (2008) and Millum (2014).
13. Whether an arational appeal actually negates voluntariness in any given case, however, depends
very much on the characteristics of the decision maker. For example, some actors may be unusu-
ally sensitive to emotional influences, while others may be able to easily ignore such appeals.
14. That said, the types of nudges envisioned by Thaler and Sunstein typically do not implicate the
control element of voluntariness because they are aimed at furthering the decision maker's
interests rather than the interests of others. Thaler and Sunstein describe nudging as a form of
"libertarian paternalism," with the paternalistic element tied to the goal of "steer[ing] people's
choices in directions that will improve their lives ... asjudged by themselves" (2008, 5).
15. Alan Meisel refers to these two options as "waiver of information" and "waiver of decision"
(1979, 453n.133).
16. The doctrine of waiver of informed consent is also recognized in American common law (see
Stuart v Loomis 2014; Cobbs v Grant 1972).
17. See also Berg et al. (2001, 88), noting that compelling patients to receive unwanted information
or make unwanted decisions "is a denial of the right to self-determination." While there are cer-
tainly concerns that allowing patients to waive their decision-making authority may leave them
more vulnerable to abuse of trust by physicians and family members (Beauchamp and Childress
2008), this is a pragmatic concern rather than a philosophical one.
18. In a case comparing regulations of billboards with newspaper advertisements, the US Supreme
Court noted that public forms of advertising (as opposed to print advertisements) "are con-
stantly before the eyes of observers on the streets and in street cars to be seen without the exer-
cise of choice or volition on their part ... [T]he message of the billboard [is] thrust upon [people]
by all the arts and devices that skill can produce," whereas "[iun the case of newspapers and
magazines, there must be some seeking by the one who is to see and read the advertisement"
(Packer Corporation v Utah 1932, 110).
19. This is not to say that all influences on a person's reasoning process will necessarily be more
autonomy-infringing than limitations on action. This discussion is merely intended to empha-
size that some persuasive appeals by the state may have a significant impact on autonomous
decision making, and so their ethical justifiability ought to be evaluated just as carefully as state
limitations on action.
20. This example was inspired by Hausman and Welch (2010).
21. Public concern about subliminal messaging (whether by the state or by private parties) is wide-
spread and often reflected in popular media and film (Mlodinow 2012). Subliminal messaging
has also been roundly criticized as a matter of American law (see Waller v Osbourne 1991; Amer-
ican Home Products Corporation v Johnson & Johnson 1978; Federal Communications Commis-
sion 1974).
22. For example, in an attempt to discourage a person from buying cigarettes by using disgust, one
might post an image of diseased lungs (related to the decision), or one might post an image of
excrement (unrelated to the decision). The first, but not the second, might serve to make salient
information relevant to the person's decision.
23. Indeed, when the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopted regulations requiring the
display of graphic images depicting the negative health consequences of smoking, it did so pre-
cisely because of their emotional impact, citing evidence that "messages that arouse emotional
reactions" are more likely to trigger behavioral changes (US Food and Drug Administration
2011, 36,635). After a variety of public objections and constitutional challenges, the FDA
announced that it will not implement the regulations as drafted (Office of Attorney General Let-
ter to John Boehner 2013).
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24. One reason for this concern may be that emotional appeals are more likely to call upon private,
rather than public, reasoning. Not every member of society will share the same response to an
emotional appeal; for example, an ultrasound image may have a very different effect on a deeply
religious person who believes life begins at conception as compared to a pro-choice advocate
whose pregnancy threatens her own health (Sawicki 2014).
25. Some may caution that drawing a distinction between persuasion by public entities and private
entities would justify the use of unethical communications by commercial actors (consider
deceptive tobacco advertising in the mid-twentieth century). In a world where corporations
often have just as much power as state actors, critics argue, it is dangerous to suggest that pri-
vate actors have greater leeway in communicating with consumers. This is a valid objection, but
I offer the argument from deliberative democracy merely in the context of state speech, without
comment as to other forms of speech. I take no stance on whether the ethics of public communi-
cations differ from the ethics of private communications; this would require a much more thor-
ough inquiry not necessary for this article's analysis.
26. The ethical obligations associated with actors in a democratic state, it should be noted, exist
regardless of whether those obligations are in fact satisfied. Thus, while some might argue that
the American public no longer expects the state to be neutral and rational in its communica-
tions, this does not negate the existence of underlying ethical constraints.
27. Note, however, that this example might not ultimately be justifiable if it fails the avoidability
conditions described herein. Moreover, this example is somewhat unique in that the persuasive
appeal is targeted at teenagers, who arguably lack full autonomy and therefore may justifiably
be treated in a paternalistic manner.
28. For an example, see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2012a, 2012b).
29. Again, however, this example may not ultimately be justifiable if it fails the avoidability condi-
tions described herein.
30. That said, many countries are experimenting with the use of simplified front-of-pack graphic
approaches to nutritional labeling, which might implicate some of the same concerns high-
lighted about other graphic appeals (Scrinis and Parker 2016).
31. A great deal of literature on nudging and choice architecture asks whether there is an ethically rel-
evant difference between natural choice architecture not guided by specific policy goals, and
choice architecture developed by state persuaders with the intent of achieving a certain outcome. I
suggest that there is. A decision maker who wishes to craft the conditions under which she makes
her decisions will likely have greater reasons to be skeptical of choice architects aimed at persuad-
ing her in a particular direction as compared to natural choice architecture that is not explicitly
aimed at achieving specific goals. For an excellent discussion of the limitations of choice architects
and why their goals might be suspect, see Lodge and Wegrich (2016).
32. According to a recent poll, 88 percent of current smokers say they wish they had never started
smoking (Jones and Saad 2012).
33. One example might be the state's use of artistic expression to support widely accepted public
values-for example, using art or music to promote solidarity in times of crisis. Such techniques
can obviously be abused (consider the Nazi Propaganda Ministry's promotion of artistic and
literary work supporting Hitler's regime), and preventing their abuse requires an understanding
of both their consequentialist and autonomy-based limitations. Thanks to an anonymous com-
menter for prompting me to consider this issue further.
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